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Introduction
One can readily identify a number of factors that, over the last ten years 
or so, have combined to reduce and destabilize the legal status and social 
standing of non-citizens who are seeking to enter or remain in Canada. 
Particularly conspicuous are the amendments to our refugee and citizenship 
laws that were introduced by the government that held power from the 2006 
election until 2015, especially those harsh measures that were introduced 
after the government obtained a majority in the legislature in 2011.1 The 
changes in question were extensive and far-reaching. A shortlist of well-
known examples indicates the scope. Prompted by concerns about fraud, 
families have been kept apart by provisions that, for example, rede? ned 
who could sponsor. 2 Prompted by economic reasons, older children were 
removed from the list of dependants who could be sponsored, even in 
circumstances where they were clearly dependent on their  parent.3 Various 
1. The major legislative changes were introduced by Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, 
SC 2012, c 17; a useful summary and critique of which is found in Amnesty International, Unbalanced 
Reforms: Recommendations with respect to Bill C-31 (Brief to the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration) (17 April 2012), online: <www.amnesty.ca/sites/
amnesty/? les/ai_brief_bill_c_31_to_parliamentary_committee_0.pdf>. In addition, the Strengthening 
Canadian Citizenship Act, SC?2014, c 22 rendered Canadian citizenship more inaccessible by imposing 
both substantive and procedural impediments.
2. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 130(3) [IRPA Regs], 
originally introduced in 2012, which requires a person who has been sponsored as a spouse to be 
a permanent resident or citizen for ? ve years before they can themselves sponsor a person as their 
spouse. 
3. The government lowered the cut-off age from 22 to 19 in 2014 (SOR/2014-140, s 2(F)). This age 
was selected for the reason that children who came to Canada at an early age were likely to become 
wealthier than those who came later. While this age has since been increased once again to a cut-off 
of 22 (Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (Age of Dependent 
Children), SOR/2017-60, s 1); the regulation nevertheless continues to deny the dependence of older 
children during post-secondary education. 
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individuals seeking to remain in Canada have been barred from access 
to an independent tribunal in a number of contexts: for instance, those 
seeking to avoid deportation who have committed minor offences4 and 
asylum seekers who on various grounds cannot appeal denials of their 
refugee claims.5 Detention has become a more frequent response to 
irregular entry, and in some cases is a mandatory response applying even 
to children.6 Health care bene? ts have been denied to many individuals 
with precarious status.7 The list goes on much further. As has been widely 
noted, citizenship, permanent residence, temporary residence and refugee 
status have all become more dif? cult to obtain and easier to lose.8
The changes in question were not only far-reaching in substance, 
they also took a number of forms, including legislative amendments,9
regulatory changes,10 and a slew of ministerial instructions,11 reviewed 
by neither cabinet nor legislature. They were also accompanied by 
explanatory backgrounders,12 and government statements that presented 
the measures as a response to what was characterized as serious threats to 
the integrity of our immigration and refugee regime from queue jumpers, 
bogus refugees, fraudsters, as well as from immigrants who brought “non-
Canadian values” with them.13 Innuendo and insinuation also magni? ed 
4. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 64(2) [IRPA], appeals to 
Immigration Appeal Division unavailable to individuals sentenced to 6 months imprisonment.
5. Ibid, s 110(2). Some rights of appeals have been restored through litigation: see, YZ v Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 892 [YZ]. 
6. Ibid, s 55(3.1), mandatory detention for children aged 16 and over who are designated as 
“irregular arrivals” under IRPA s 20.1.
7. Although also restored as a result of litigation. See, Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v 
Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 651 [Canadian Doctors].
8. See, for example, Brief of the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers (Brief to the Citizenship 
and Immigration Committee of the House of Commons) (5 May 2014), online: <carl-acaadr.ca/sites/
default/? les/CARL%20C-24%20Brief%20to%20CIMM.pdf>.
9. Supra note 1.
10. The various regulations are noted in the relevant Annual Reports to Parliament, online: <www.
canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals.html>.
11. A list of ministerial instructions is available online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/ministerial-instructions.
html>.
12. Backgrounders are archived online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/
news/archives.html>.
13. Such statements were widely reported. For example, Sarah Boesveld, “Efforts to keep bogus 
Roma refugees out have failed: Jason Kenney,” National Post (22 April 2012), online: <nationalpost.
com/news/canada/efforts-to-keep-bogus-roma-refugees-out-have-failed-jason-kenney>. See 
generally, the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act, SC 2015, c 29 and accompanying 
widely reported government comments? In addition, in her caustic judgment in Canadian Doctors, 
supra note 7, MacTavish J makes several references to remarks from the Minister’s of? ce prejudging 
refugee claims as “bogus.”
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links between immigrants and organized crime and terrorism.14 In addition, 
front-line of? cials, unreviewed by superiors within their organization, were 
given a strong mandate to protect national security, and have adopted more 
aggressive, less facilitative approaches to those attempting to negotiate 
their way through the system.15 
Simultaneously, we have witnessed an increase in public expressions 
of anti-immigrant sentiment.16 Mainstream political debate has become 
infected and in? uenced in alarming ways by xenophobic invective as 
newcomers and temporary workers are misidenti? ed as a primary source of 
various past and present social ills and as a likely source of potential future 
harms. Individual non-citizens are attacked because of characteristics they 
are deemed falsely to have, or because of characteristics they do have 
but that are deemed wrongly to be pernicious. Antagonism to newcomers 
may also focus variably and not necessarily consistently on race, religion, 
cultural practices, place of origin, language skills and other factors. 
It is not unreasonable to talk about the rise of xenophobia and to 
suspect that the government’s package of immigration and citizenship 
reforms has helped stoke the irrational fears of those who feel threatened 
by newcomers and has increased the con? dence and strength of anti-
immigrant groups and organizations. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to 
suspect that xenophobes’ irrational fears may have reciprocally in? uenced 
the government’s decision to develop and implement the relevant measures. 
It would not be outlandish to conclude that, although each measure of 
harsh treatment is directed at a discrete and narrowly de? ned category 
of non-citizen, each measure operates like a single pixel that, only in 
combination with many others, presents the viewer with a comprehensible 
image. In this case, the cumulative message from the government could be 
interpreted as the message that in our immigration processes the interests 
of the existing citizenry always come ? rst and extreme measures may 
14. See, for example, Canadian Press, “Kenney blasted for linking Toronto gun violence to ‘foreign 
gangsters,’” Vancouver Sun (20 July 2012), online: <www.vancouversun.com/Kenney+blasted+linki
ng+Toronto+violence+foreign+gangsters/6966596/story.html>.
15. See Tony Keller, “Canada Has Its Own Ways of Keeping Out Unwanted Immigrants,” The 
Atlantic (12 July 2018), online: <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/07/canada-
immigration-success/564944/>. See also Geoffrey York & Michelle Zilio, “Access Denied: Canada’s 
Refusal Rate for Visitor Visas Soars,” Globe & Mail (8 July 2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.
com/world/article-access-denied-canadas-refusal-rate-for-visitor-visas-soars/>; and Nicholas Keung, 
“Audit of immigration detention review system reveals culture that favours incarceration,” Toronto 
Star (20 July 2018), online: <www.thestar.com/news/gta/2018/07/21/audit-of-immigration-detention-
review-system-reveals-culture-that-favours-incarceration.html>.
16. See, for example, Craig S Smith?&?Dan Levin, “As Canada Transforms, an Anti-Immigrant 
Fringe Stirs,” New York Times (21 January 2017), online: <www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/world/
americas/canada-quebec-nationalists.html>.
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be imposed where these interests might be in jeopardy. Each prominent 
example of oppressive treatment may be interpreted as aiming to assuage 
the general fears of anxious insiders and to respond to their demands.17 A 
quick glance at the history of Canadian immigration law18 reveals that this 
recent experience is hardly novel. Through the years, nativism, jingoism 
and xenophobia have emerged and re-emerged in the public sphere leading 
to harsher immigration laws. 
In general terms, the recent package of reforms has raised four major 
concerns. First, are they gratuitously harsh? Is their serious impact on 
various groups necessary to achieve the purposes for which they were 
said to be introduced? Do they show adequate concern for the interests of 
those directly affected? Second, are they over-inclusive? Are they tailored 
suf? ciently to target only those individuals whose behaviour is considered 
problematic, or do they have a negative impact on others who are caught 
innocently within the same net? Third, do they impose serious hardship 
on some individuals who have merely exercised their rights or who have 
failed to meet demanding conditions, solely to deter large numbers of 
others from engaging in similar conduct? In other words, are they imposing 
unreasonably high burdens on some individuals for reasons of the public 
good? Fourth, are they prompted by antagonism towards outsiders, or to 
pander to groups within the polity who bear such resentment? There is also 
an ancillary concern: whether there is adequate legal redress if a positive 
answer can be given to any of these questions.
In response to the package of reforms and the concerns they have 
raised, immigration lawyers have not been inactive. They have devised 
and maintained important, well-conceived challenges against various legal 
provisions. In doing so, they have relied on a familiar set of legal sources 
in their attempts to challenge the validity of the measures in question or 
to minimize their impact. They have placed signi? cant reliance both on 
established administrative law doctrines and on section 7 of the ?????????
17. It should be acknowledged that since 2015, a signi? cant number of the reforms have been 
annulled, both by the courts and by a new government that is more temperate in its rhetoric. However, 
while in? ammatory language from of? cials may have subsided, many of the above-noted changes 
have been maintained.
18. The classic source is Ninette Kelley & Michael Trebilcock, ????????????????????????, 2nd ed 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010): “…narrow (nativist) conceptions of community…and 
ideological hostility to collectivism in the organization of the economy seem largely to explain the 
exclusion of Asian and black immigrants, …the refusal to admit Jewish refugees before and during the 
Second World War, the internment of Japanese Canadians during the second World War, the screening 
out of alleged Communist sympathizers on national security grounds during the 1950’s and 1960s…” 
at 464.
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms,19 which guarantees “the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”20 
However, lawyers have only rarely relied on other sections of the 
Charter when challenging the legal validity of government measures. 
Speci? cally, they have tended to shy away from relying on section 15, 
which provides that “every individual is equal before and under the law 
and has the right to the equal protection and equal bene? t of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability.” Thus, Charter challenges have not been based on the claim that 
our laws or their application have been tainted by xenophobic impulses. 
The reluctance of lawyers to rely on this section is not at all mysterious. 
Authoritative decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada have, in no 
uncertain terms, asserted that laws governing the admission and removal 
of non-citizens are virtually immune from section 15 challenge,21 except 
in the special case where they single out sub-groups of non-citizens for 
negative treatment on pernicious grounds, such as national origin.22 
In the following pages, I argue that we should now reconsider these 
judicial decisions and promote the view that section 15 should play a 
more prominent role in litigation that challenges punitive or excessively 
repressive provisions in our regime of immigration laws. Only if we 
develop an egalitarian legal doctrine that is rooted in section 15, will we 
address all four of the general concerns noted above. Rather than disallow 
equality-based challenges to our immigration laws, we should welcome 
litigation that seeks to prove the suspicions that our immigration laws 
may have been shaped by the in? uence of xenophobic ideologies which 
may, in turn, have been fertilized autopoetically by government laws and 
policies. Even where oppressive immigration laws are applicable to all 
non-citizens and differentiate them as a class from citizens, we should 
welcome a forum for review in which we scrutinize their full impact 
19. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
20. It is interesting to note that on occasion, lawyers also continue to rely on the Canadian Bill of 
Rights, SC 1960, c 44. See, Hassouna v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 
473.
21. The leading cases, discussed below, are Charkaoui v Canada (Immigration and Citizenship), 
2007 SCC 9 [Charkaoui] and Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v Chiarelli, [1992] 
1 SCR 711, 1 RCS 711 [Chiarelli]. See the text accompanying notes 28 and 29, below.
22. See, for example, Canadian Doctors, supra note 7; discussed infra note 75; YZ, supra note 5, 
discussed infra note 79; and Tabingo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 377, (FCTD)
[Tabingo]; discussed infra at note 72, aff’d 2014 FCA 191 [Tabingo Appeal] discussed infra at note 74.
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on non-citizens so that we can appraise accurately the actual harms and 
bene? ts and consider government reasons for imposing such rules under 
section 1 of the ???????.23
I do not argue that any speci? c legal provisions violate section 15. 
Such an argument would require more detailed attention to the wider 
social, historical and political milieu than space permits. Instead, I operate 
at a more general level, arguing that the reasons and premises underlying 
the decisions to immunize immigration law from equality challenges are 
deeply problematic. Not only are those reasons and premises insuf? cient 
to ground a comprehensive immunity, they are also inconsistent both with 
general doctrines of equality that were accepted at the time the decisions 
were made and those that have gained currency today. More speci? cally, 
they con? ict with approaches to equality that demand a consideration of 
contextual factors, including an appraisal of historical experience, rather 
than mere formalistic categorization; they con? ict with decisions that 
demand that we examine the actual impact that laws have rather than 
their purpose; they con? ict with approaches that look beyond differential 
treatment to emphasize that a principle of equal concern and respect should 
be regarded as the fundamental principle of analysis; and they con? ict 
with approaches that adopt the concept of substantive equality as the basic 
fulcrum for analysis. 
In addition, recognition of the corrosive effects of xenophobia has 
developed and become more widespread since many of these decisions 
were made.24 Our experience of anti-immigrant and anti-immigration 
polemic within mainstream political discourse and the wide-ranging 
ways in which xenophobia reveals itself should alert us to the dangers 
of immunization of particular areas of law from egalitarian challenge.25
When nativist views gain currency, it is likelier that xenophobic laws will 
be enacted, particularly in the contentious ? eld of immigration. It should 
also be noted that section 7 of the ????????has, in many ways, proved to 
be an ineffective and unreliable tool to challenge the constitutionality of 
23. ???????, ????? note 19, s 1; Where there is a heavy onus is on the government to show that any 
infringement of a right is demonstrably justi? able in a free and democratic society.
24. See, for example, recently signed ????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????13 
July 2018, online: <www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/migration.pdf.>; which 
makes multiple references to xenophobia and reveals high levels of concern about its rise. 
25. As reported by Statistics Canada, “After steady but relatively small increases since 2014, police-
reported hate crime in Canada rose sharply in 2017, up 47% over the previous year, and largely the 
result of an increase in hate-related property crimes, such as graf? ti and vandalism. For the year, police 
reported 2,073 hate crimes, 664 more than in 2016. Higher numbers were seen across most types of 
hate crime, with incidents targeting the Muslim, Jewish, and Black populations accounting for most 
of the national increase.” See, Statistics Canada, “Police-reported hate crime, 2017,” ????????? (28 
November 2018), online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/181129/dq181129a-eng.htm>.
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immigration laws.26 It is therefore appropriate to look for other devices 
that may offer additional legal protection.
In order to develop these points, I proceed as follows: First, I outline and 
analyse critically the decisive passages in the two leading Supreme Court 
cases that considered the interplay between section 15 and immigration 
law, and effectively closed off avenues for section 15 advocacy within 
the ? eld. A major problem with these cases is that they make no helpful 
reference to leading equality decisions beyond the sphere of immigration. 
They also promote a concept of discrimination that is less nuanced than 
that found in these leading cases. While it is sometimes dif? cult to fathom 
how their terse analysis actually aligns with the decisions in which broader 
principles are articulated, it seems clear that the immigration cases are 
based on the weak premise that differential treatment between citizens and 
non-citizens in the realm of immigration law should not be characterized 
as discriminatory on a ground analogous to those enumerated in section 
15 and should, as a result, be immune from section 15 challenge. I 
attempt to expose the weaknesses of this claim. I then examine other 
equality decisions from the same era. These decisions introduced some 
important doctrinal claims about the values that should underpin our 
concept of discrimination. I argue that these principles are still relevant 
and I use these cases to expose further the disingenuous arti? ce on which 
the immigration cases are based. Subsequently, I examine more recent 
decisions on equality in which the Supreme Court of Canada has raised 
doubts about the mandatory use of comparator groups when determining 
whether a person has been treated unequally and has promoted the pursuit 
of substantive equality. I suggest that these ideas clash with the approach 
taken in the decisions that immunize immigration law from section 15 
challenges. I also examine some early decisions in which the Supreme 
Court suggests that a broad range of laws are insulated from ??????? 
review and suggest that these cases have a narrow ambit that should not 
be extended to embrace immigration laws. Finally, I turn to some recent 
immigration cases in which current equality principles have been adopted 
—cases in which the question is whether differentiation between groups of 
non-citizens is discriminatory—to show how they too have failed to take 
seriously some key ideas that must be confronted if xenophobia is to be 
addressed adequately. 
26. See Catherine Dauvergne, “How The Charter has Failed Non-Citizens in Canada: Reviewing 
Thirty Years of Jurisprudence” (2013) 58:3 McGill LJ 663; arguing that the principles of fundamental 
justice, having been analysed through a lens that places more importance on national security rather 
than on basic rights, have been unduly diluted. 
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 I. Immunizing immigration decisions from section 15: Interpreting 
Charkaoui
A helpful point of entry is the Supreme Court’s decision in Charkaoui,27
a decision that followed closely on the 2006 election and one that dashed 
hopes that section 15 of the Charter would provide a set of tools to protect 
the interests of non-citizens as they negotiate the immigration process. 
In unequivocal terms, the Court denied that the distinction between non-
citizen and citizen as found in our immigration and citizenship laws can 
ground a section 15 challenge, barring very exceptional circumstances. 
The relevant passages should be parsed carefully.
McLachlin C.J. introduces the issue thus:
The appellant Mr. Charkaoui argues that the IRPA certi? cate scheme 
[which can lead to deportation on security grounds] discriminates 
against noncitizens, contrary to s. 15(1) of the Charter. However, s. 6 of 
the Charter speci? cally allows for differential treatment of citizens and 
noncitizens in deportation matters: only citizens are accorded the right 
to enter, remain in and leave Canada (s. 6(1)). A deportation scheme that 
applies to noncitizens, but not to citizens, does not, for that reason alone, 
violate s. 15 of the Charter : Chiarelli.28
On ? rst sight, this is an accurate statement of the law. Section 6 
does indeed allow for differential treatment29 and indeed, it ensures it by 
guaranteeing a package of rights to citizens that is not granted to others. 
The fact that non-citizens are denied these rights by virtue of their status 
27. Charkaoui, supra note 21.
28. Ibid at para. 129. As explained below, the reference to Chiarelli is signi? cant. See below, the text 
accompanying note 31.
29. Section 6 of the Charter, supra note 19, reads as follows:
6. (1) Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada.
(2) Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent resident of 
Canada has the right
a) to move to and take up residence in any province; and
b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.
(3) The rights speci? ed in subsection (2) are subject to
a) any laws or practices of general application in force in a province other than those that 
discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of province of present or previous 
residence; and
b) any laws providing for reasonable residency requirements as a quali? cation for the receipt 
of publicly provided social services.
(4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object 
the amelioration in a province of conditions of individuals in that province who are socially 
or economically disadvantaged if the rate of employment in that province is below the rate of 
employment in Canada.
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is, thus, not a matter that can be challenged constitutionally.30 However, 
McLachlin C.J.’s words do seem to provide non-citizens with the 
possibility of a successful challenge in some circumstances. The inclusion 
of the phrase “for that reason alone” should give us pause. We should note 
its various possible meanings and from these, select one that ? ts best. 
On the one hand, the phrase suggests that if non-citizens can identify 
an offensive aspect of the deportation scheme that has a profound impact 
on their interests then they might be able to successfully mount a challenge 
that the differential treatment that they are accorded, compared to that 
accorded to citizens, can amount to a violation of section 15. Under 
this reading, the Court would not be seeking to immunize the ? eld from 
challenge. Instead, it would merely be adding a further demand to litigants: 
show us that there is something going on here that is more than the mere 
creation of a set of rules de? ning who has access to the country. In other 
words, a claimant who, for example, showed that rules about entry and 
residence imposed oppressive or unfair conditions, or who revealed that 
the rules were created by a political party that regularly engaged in the 
vili? cation of non-citizens might succeed. Within a speci? c context, the 
oppressiveness of a condition attached to a law that does not apply to 
citizens might provide the required additional reason that would permit a 
court to ? nd that the scheme in question violated section 15.
However, a closer reading of the whole text reveals that this is not 
what is intended here. Ultimately, it becomes clear that, with one very 
small exception, non-citizens are always to be denied the opportunity to 
challenge immigration schemes if their claim pivots on differential treatment 
between non-citizens and citizens. The court is stating that, in such cases, 
there is suf? cient reason to bar an equality challenge. For a non-citizen 
to successfully challenge a deportation scheme as discriminatory, that 
scheme would also have to differentiate on other grounds. For example, it 
would need to differentiate among non-citizens on grounds such as ethnic 
origin or religion or other analogous or enumerated grounds. 
The reference to ????????? is the ? rst indicator that this latter 
interpretation is the correct one. The relevant passage in Sopinka J.’s 
judgment reads as follows:
30. I do not consider here the argument that the Constitution, by guaranteeing rights to citizens, is 
not guaranteeing them exclusively to citizens. According to this argument, in special circumstances, 
various non-citizens may have a constitutional right to enter or remain in the country. Such an 
argument has not fared well in the courts. See ???????????????????????????????????????????), [2000] 
FCJ No 407, 186 DLR (4th) 512. Nevertheless, I believe that its full merit has been underappreciated. 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ??
While permanent residents are given various mobility rights in s. 
6(2), only citizens are accorded the right to enter, remain in and leave 
Canada in s. 6(1). There is therefore no discrimination contrary to s. 15 
in a deportation scheme that applies to permanent residents, but not to 
citizens.31 [emphasis added]
Sopinka J.’s categorical conclusion that there is no discrimination is 
based on the understanding that a differentiation will be discriminatory 
only if it is made on one of the grounds listed in section 15 or an analogous 
ground. He is not here cataloguing all the factors that are required to show 
that a distinction is discriminatory. Instead, he is identifying a preliminary 
? nding that must be made before the inquiry can continue. He is asserting 
that one can decide that differentiation is not discriminatory merely by 
? nding that the distinction is neither enumerated nor analogous. Because 
he is attempting to show that a deportation scheme is not discriminatory, 
Sopinka J. does not pursue an inquiry into any additional factors, 
presumably because he thinks that it is unnecessary to do so. Because 
the distinction between citizen and non-citizen is authorized in a speci? c 
context, the differentiation is not based on a proscribed ground. Citizenship 
status, if it relates to the immigration process, is neither enumerated nor 
analogous. This terminates the section 15 inquiry at an early point.
Not only does McLachlin C.J. adopt Sopinka J.’s explanation of 
discrimination, she also adds ? esh to the skeleton by adding extra caveats:
….there are two ways in which the IRPA could, in some circumstances, 
result in discrimination. First, detention may become inde? nite as 
deportation is put off or becomes impossible, for example because there is 
no country to which the person can be deported. Second, the government 
could conceivably use the IRPA not for the purpose of deportation, but 
to detain the person on security grounds. In both situations, the source of 
the problem is that the detention is no longer related, in effect or purpose, 
to the goal of deportation.
In Re A, the legislation considered by the House of Lords expressly 
provided for inde? nite detention; this was an important factor leading 
to the majority’s holding that the legislation went beyond the concerns 
of immigration legislation and thus wrongfully discriminated between 
nationals and non-nationals…Even though the detention of some of the 
appellants has been long—indeed, Mr. Almrei’s continues—the record 
on which we must rely does not establish that the detentions at issue have 
become unhinged from the state’s purpose of deportation…. [emphasis 
added]32
31. Chiarelli, supra note 21 at para 32.
32. Charkaoui, supra note 21 at paras 130, 131. The Reference to Re A is a reference to A v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, [2005] 3 All ER 169, [2004] UKHL 56.
??? ?????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ?????????????????????? ????????????????? ???????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ??? ??? ?????????????????????? ?? ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ???????
???? ????????? ????????? ????????? ??? ????? ???? ????? ???????? ???? ?????? ???
????????????? ???????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
?????? ?????????? ????????? ??? ??? ??????????? ????????????? ??? ???? ?????????
??? ????????????? ???? ????????????? ????????? ??? ???? ??????????????? ??? ????
???????????? ??????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ??? ??????????? ??? ?????? ???????? ???? ???????? ????????? ??? ????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ???????? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ????? ??? ????????? ???????????? ?????
??? ????????????? ????????? ??? ??? ?????? ????????? ????????? ?????????????? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ????????
??? ?????????? ????? ???????? ??????? ??? ???????? ???? ????????? ?????????????
??????????????????????????? ??? ????????????????????? ?????????????????????
???? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????? ??? ??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ???????????????????? ????
???? ???????????????????????????? ??????? ??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
??????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????? ??
purpose, cease to create the immunization because a court is justi? ed in 
? nding that they do not relate to deportation because of the absence of any 
effective way for it to contribute to that end. 
The important point to note is that McLachlin C.J. is claiming that when 
an underlying immigration purpose may still be achieved, the seriousness 
of its impact on the individual is totally irrelevant to the determination that 
it is not discriminatory. Thus, while the impact of lengthy detention on Mr. 
Almrei was recognized to be severe, achieving the government’s purpose 
of deportation was still characterized as within the realm of the possible. 
Since deportation has not become impossible, the detention could be 
characterized as part and parcel of the process of removal and therefore 
could not be considered to be discriminatory, no matter how repressive.
Although she does not cite it, it is likely that the Chief Justice had 
in mind the general approach to discrimination cases that had been 
developed by Iacobucci J. speaking for the Court in the case of ???????
???????(???????????? ?????????? ????????????)35 a few years previously. 
Iacobucci J. summarized the approach as follows:
Accordingly, a court that is called upon to determine a discrimination 
claim under s. 15(1) should make the following three broad inquiries:
(A) Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the 
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, 
or (b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already disadvantaged 
position within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential 
treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more 
personal characteristics?
(B) Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more 
enumerated and analogous grounds?
and
(C) Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden 
upon or withholding a bene? t from the claimant in a manner which 
re? ects the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal 
characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or 
promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of 
recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian 
society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration?36
The decision in ?????????? is reached by addressing the second of 
these points. The deportation scheme in question imposes substantively 
differential treatment between the claimant and others, but the treatment 
35. ??????????
36. ???? at para 88.
??? ?????????????????????????
is not “based on one or more enumerated and analogous grounds.” One’s 
status as a non-citizen cannot count as an analogous ground when the 
differentiation in question relates to the immigration or removal process. 
The fact that the Charter itself permits such differentiation provides 
foundational support for this conclusion. In essence, the underlying 
argument seems to be that, if we were to recognize lack of citizenship 
status as a ground of discrimination, we would be unable to produce a 
body of immigration law. Indeed, we would be unable to develop a regime 
that treated citizens and non-citizens differently.37 
 II. The Tension between Charkaoui and Andrews38
On their face, the views expressed by McLachlin C.J. and Sopinka J. 
are perplexing. One should remember that in Andrews v. Law Society of 
British Columbia, the leading precedent at the time Chiarelli was decided, 
the Supreme Court had held that non-citizens fall into a category analogous 
to those speci? cally enumerated in s. 15. To distinguish between citizens and 
non-citizens is to differentiate on a prohibited ground. Wilson J. memorably 
offers the following explanation:
Relative to citizens, non-citizens are a group lacking in political power 
and as such vulnerable to having their interests overlooked and their 
rights to equal concern and respect violated. They are among “those 
groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected of? cials have no 
apparent interest in attending”: see J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 
(1980), at p. 151. Non-citizens, to take only the most obvious example, 
do not have the right to vote….I would conclude therefore that non-
citizens fall into an analogous category to those speci? cally enumerated 
in s. 15. I emphasize, moreover, that this is a determination which is not 
to be made only in the context of the law which is subject to challenge but 
rather in the context of the place of the group in the entire social, political 
and legal fabric of our society. While legislatures must inevitably draw 
distinctions among the governed, such distinctions should not bring 
about or reinforce the disadvantage of certain groups and individuals 
by denying them the rights freely accorded to others.39 [emphasis added]
The emphasized passage suggests that you cannot pick and choose 
contexts in which to make the determination that non-citizens are 
particularly vulnerable, lack political power and are therefore at risk of 
37. In Lavoie v Canada, [2002] 1 SCR 769 [Lavoie], it was argued unsuccessfully that recognizing 
immigration status as a ground analogous to those listed in section 15 in any ? eld would “negate or 
abolish the concept of citizenship.” The majority noted at para 39, “As [the respondents] put it, “[b]y 
universal de? nition and by constitutional ? at, …citizens and non-citizens are unequal in status.” This 
case is discussed infra in the text accompanying note 46.
38. Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989]1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1 [Andrews].
39. Ibid at para 5. 
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suffering abuse. It is this general vulnerability in every social context 
(including the realm of immigration and deportation) that leads to the 
conclusion that non-citizen status is analogous to the grounds enumerated 
in section 15. The determination that non-citizens fall into an analogous 
category is not context dependent. If it is non-citizens’ vulnerability that 
exposes them to the risk of abusive treatment and that therefore justi? es a 
close scrutiny of their treatment comparative to how citizens are treated, 
then the ? eld of immigration law should not be considered exceptional. 
In response to this powerful explanation, the reasoning of McLachlin 
C.J. and Sopinka J. appears to be syllogistic in nature:
(1) Deportation schemes that differentiate only between citizens and 
non-citizens40 are authorized by the Constitution.
(2) This is a deportation scheme that differentiates only between 
citizens and non-citizens.
(3) This scheme is authorized by the Constitution.
The fallacy in this logic can be exposed by noting that the guarantees 
found in section 6 of the ??????? do not provide any logical answer to 
the question whether the distinction between citizens and non-citizens 
in this context is discriminatory. If, when considering the constitutional 
provision, one keeps in mind the three-part schema adopted in ???, one 
can readily identify that different interpretations of section 6 are possible. 
One option is, indeed, the one that is selected by McLachlin C.J.: it is 
not unconstitutional to provide different packages or rights to citizens and 
non-citizens in the immigration context because in that context it is not 
discriminatory to make such a differentiation. 
However, a second option is to hold that, while sets of rules de? ning 
entry and removal that distinguish between citizen and non-citizen are not 
for that reason alone invidious, it is open to a litigant to show that the 
particular instance in question does discriminate. This option would bring 
into play the factors identi? ed in the third part of the schema outlined in 
???: since the burden placed upon non-citizens by deportation schemes, 
considered in the abstract, does not ???????have the effect of perpetuating 
or promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of 
recognition they are not presumptively discriminatory. However, it would 
be open to a non-citizen to show that any particular deportation scheme 
would have that effect. Such proof could rebut any presumption. A non-
citizen could claim with justi? cation that while they do not have a right 
not to be deported, they do have a right that the deportation process be 
conducted according to high standards of treatment and in a respectful 
40. As opposed to schemes that distinguish among different categories of non-citizen.
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no bearing on the conclusion that the regime is not discriminatory.42
Assuming that the government can achieve its purpose, it is that purpose 
rather than its impacts that determines that we are in the zone of immunity. 
Thus, as will be shown in further detail below, the approach is antithetical 
to approaches that advocate that inquiries into discrimination should be 
effects-based rather than merely purpose-based.43
In the remaining pages of this paper, I present three major reasons for 
rejecting the Charkaoui/Chiarelli approach. 
First, the approach does not easily co-exist either with the general 
jurisprudence on equality that was current at the time Charkaoui was 
decided, or with the judicial doctrine that has developed since then. 
Second, it fails to recognize and address the full impact of xenophobia 
as a signi? cant social problem. And third, it has had a negative impact 
on judicial reasoning in those few immigration cases where judges have 
concluded that the section 15 rights of various groups of noncitizens have 
been infringed.
I address each of these in turn. 
 III. The tension between Charkaoui and early equality jurisprudence
The oddness of the decisions in Charkaoui and Chiarelli becomes 
noticeable when one looks ? rst at analyses of discrimination found in 
other cases of the same vintage. I can make my point by adverting to two 
such cases—Law and Lavoie.
In Law, the Court had insisted vigorously that equality analysis “is to 
be undertaken in a purposive and contextualized manner.” Moreover, it 
revealed and traced out the basic purpose underlying section 15 as follows:
It may be said that the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation 
of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of 
disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to 
promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as 
42. As Colin Grey pointed out to me, it is fruitful to distinguish McLachlin CJ’s views on section 
15 with those that she expresses on section 7. Here, she is making the claim that an immigration 
law is immunized from section 15 challenge no matter how serious the harm incurred. In relation 
to section 7, she notes, “Medovarski thus does not stand for the proposition that proceedings related 
to deportation in the immigration context are immune from s. 7 scrutiny.  While the deportation of 
a non-citizen in the immigration context may not in itself engage s. 7 of the Charter, some features 
associated with deportation, such as detention in the course of the certi? cate process or the prospect of 
deportation to torture, may do so.” Charkaoui, supra note 21 at para 17.
43. In Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12 at para 39 [Withler]. This point is made 
clearly: “The focus of the inquiry is on the actual impact of the impugned law, taking full account of 
social, political, economic and historical factors concerning the group.”Also in AG v A, supra note 41 
at para 319, Abella J. quotes McIntyre J. in Andrews: “[T]he main consideration must be the impact of 
the law on the individual or the group concerned.”
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human beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and 
equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.44
The ????????????????????approach, by maintaining that any rational 
connection between the treatment and immigration goals is suf? cient to 
halt a s. 15 challenge in its tracks before considering whether essential 
human dignity has been violated adopts a return to formalistic tendencies 
that are inconsistent with the general contextualizing approach advocated 
in ????and further emphasized in later cases. No matter how oppressive 
our immigration laws, no matter how much disdain they reveal for those 
seeking to enter and remain in Canada, they are immune from being 
considered discriminatory, on the ground that the distinction between 
citizen and non-citizen is a pre-requisite for any immigration process to 
get off the ground. These contextual factors are seemingly irrelevant when 
determining whether an immigration measure is discriminatory. While it 
may be accepted for the purpose of argument that drawing a distinction 
between citizen and non-citizen may not in itself interfere with the 
promotion of  “a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at 
law as human beings” any speci? c iteration of that distinction even in the 
realm of immigration law may do so. A clear example would be where 
immigrants are mandatorily separated from their children at the border and 
deported without them (as they have recently been in the United States).
Also, in ???? the Court discusses how comparator groups should be 
selected;
To locate the appropriate comparator, we must consider a variety of 
factors, including the subject-matter of the legislation. The object 
of a s. 15(1) analysis is not to determine equality in the abstract; it is 
to determine whether the impugned legislation creates differential 
treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of enumerated 
or analogous grounds, which results in discrimination. Both the purpose 
and the effect of the legislation must be considered in determining the 
appropriate comparison group or groups. Other contextual factors may 
also be relevant. The biological, historical, and sociological similarities 
or dissimilarities may be relevant in establishing the relevant comparator 
in particular, and whether the legislation effects discrimination in a 
substantive sense more generally….45
The decision to proscribe using citizens as a comparator group when 
immigration laws are at issue ???????????????????????????????????????????????
44. ?????????? note 34 at para 51.
45. ???? at para 57.
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law is incompatible with this analysis which emphasizes examining the 
effect of legislation when determining the relevant group. 
In Lavoie, Bastarache J., for the majority, adverts to a tension between 
Chiarelli and Andrews:
This case has much in common with both Andrews and Chiarelli. Like 
Andrews, it involves differential treatment in employment that is not 
explicitly authorized by the Charter; like Chiarelli, it involves a federal 
law that is part of a recognized package of privileges conferred on 
Canadian citizens. This combination of factors makes it dif? cult to decide 
whether, at the end of the day, the law con? icts with the purpose of s. 
15(1) of the Charter. Based on this Court’s recent s. 15(1) jurisprudence, 
I conclude that it does.46
Bastarache J. begins his analysis by noting that the case looks as if it 
is straightforward and calls for an uncontroversial application of Andrews:
the impugned law draws a clear distinction between citizens and non-
citizens, and the latter constitutes an analogous ground of discrimination 
under s. 15(1): see Andrews…47
However, an argument from the respondents gives him pause:
Nevertheless, the respondents argue that the whole point of federal 
citizenship legislation is to treat citizens and non-citizens differently, and 
therefore that the two groups cannot validly be compared for s. 15(1) 
purposes. As they put it, “[b]y universal de? nition and by constitutional 
? at, …citizens and non-citizens are unequal in status. To treat them 
equally would be to negate or abolish the concept of citizenship”….In 
their view, however, such a comparison is not appropriate in the case 
of “a citizenship de? ning law that draws a constitutionally permitted 
distinction between citizens and non-citizens.” In such a case, the s. 
15(1) analysis would undermine the fundamental difference between 
citizens and non-citizens…48
To address this concern, Bastarache J. focuses ? rst on the use of 
citizenship as a comparator group and on the proper stage in the analysis 
that this should occur:
Whether citizens are an appropriate comparator in this case is, in my 
view, better dealt with as a contextual factor under the third branch of 
the Law analysis than as a bar to recognizing a legislative distinction. 
Although Iacobucci J. stressed the importance of identifying an 
appropriate comparator group, there is nothing in Law to indicate that the 
46. Lavoie, supra note 37 at para 37.
47. Ibid at para 39.
48. Ibid.
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my analysis of Law and Lavoie. While the court has dispensed with the 
tripartite schema developed in Law and has condensed it into a two-part 
test, this change does nothing to reduce the friction.52 Emphasis on the 
centrality of a conception of substantive, as opposed to formal, equality 
has increased the dif? culty of continuing to maintain a preliminary ? lter 
that permits laws dealing with immigration to be immune from section 15 
challenge.
For example, in Withler53 the court attempts to simplify the 
jurisprudence by stating: 
At the end of the day there is only one question:  Does the challenged 
law violate the norm of substantive equality in s. 15(1) of the Charter?”54
The court offers an analysis of substantive equality that suggests that 
it would be quite appropriate to inquire whether xenophobic antipathy is 
re? ected in our laws, including our immigration laws, and their impacts:
The analysis at the second step is an inquiry into whether the law works 
substantive inequality, by perpetuating disadvantage or prejudice, or by 
stereotyping in a way that does not correspond to actual characteristics 
or circumstances.55
In Quebec (Attorney General) v. A,56 the Court goes on to unpack the 
concept of substantive equality as follows: 
substantive equality is not denied solely because a disadvantage is 
imposed. Rather, it is denied by the imposition of a disadvantage that is 
unfair or objectionable, which is most often the case if the disadvantage 
perpetuates prejudice or stereotypes.57
The Court then quotes Sophia Moreau:
We think of discrimination not just as any sort of differential treatment 
but as a particular kind of differential treatment: to be discriminated 
against is not just to be denied something that others have but to be 
denied it in a way that is objectionable or unfair.58 [emphasis added]
52. The jurisprudence establishes a two-part test for assessing a s 15(1) claim: (1) Does the law 
create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground? (2) Does the distinction create a 
disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping? See R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at para 17.
53. Withler, supra note 43.
54. Ibid at para 2.
55. Ibid at para 65.
56. AG v A, supra note 41.
57. Ibid at para 180.
58. Ibid.
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In the immigration context, this might involve considering the 
differences between citizens and non-citizens when deciding that a 
particular part of the regime is substantively unjust.
 IV. Jurisprudence that supports Charkaoui
Despite the friction between Charkaoui and Chiarelli on the one hand, 
and leading jurisprudence on the other, it must be noted and conceded that 
there is a strain of jurisprudence with which they are more compatible. 
The jurisprudence includes a case in which McLachlin J. (as she then was) 
dissents vigorously. The cases in question deal with the provincial funding 
of separate schools and decide that a particular sphere of legislation is 
insulated from Charter review. It should be noted at the outset that in these 
cases, unlike Chiarelli and Charkaoui, it is not held that the laws withstand 
Charter challenge because they are not discriminatory. The reasons for the 
decision are more basic. Nevertheless, these cases should remind us that 
Charkaoui and Chiarelli are not unique or extraordinary in their attempts 
to immunize laws from Charter review.
The ? rst case is Reference Re Bill C-3061 in which Wilson J. introduced 
the idea that a wide range of legislative measures may be insulated from 
Charter challenge. The case concerned legislation in Ontario that was 
to extend provincial funding to Roman Catholic Separate Schools. The 
Ontario Government argued that the Bill was a justi? able exercise of 
power under s. 93 of the Constitution Act.62
Amongst the arguments mounted against the legislation was the 
argument that, by providing Roman Catholic schools with ? nancial 
bene? ts not made equally available to other taxpayers and other religious 
schools, Bill 30 violated the equality guarantee in s. 15(1) of the Charter. 
In response, the Ontario Government argued that such law was insulated 
from Charter challenge by section 29 of the Charter.63
61. [1987] 1 SCR 1148, 40 DLR (4th) 18 [Bill C-30].
62. Section 93 reads: “In and for each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in 
relation to Education, subject and according to the following Provisions: 
(1) Nothing in any such Law shall prejudicially affect any Right or Privilege with respect to 
Denominational Schools which any Class of Persons have by Law in the Province at the Union….
(3) Where in any Province a System of Separate or Dissentient Schools exists by Law at the 
Union or is thereafter established by the Legislature of the Province, an Appeal shall lie to the 
Governor General in Council from any Act or Decision of any Provincial Authority affecting 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ???????????????????
relation to Education…” The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(UK), 1982, c 11.
63. Section 29 provides, “Nothing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or 
privileges guaranteed by or under the Constitution of Canada in respect of denominational, separate or 
dissentient schools.” Charter, supra, note 19, s 29.
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Provinces exercising their plenary powers to provide education services 
must, subject to this restriction, comply with the Charter.68
There is good reason to believe that Wilson J.’s analysis is no longer 
good law although it has never been formally repudiated. First, in 
Lavoie, Bastarache J. explicitly rejected an argument that jurisdictional 
considerations are relevant when determining whether the Charter 
applies.69 Moreover, in EGALE Canada v. Canada,70 the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal refused to apply Wilson J.’s analysis in a context other 
than the funding of separate schools, and emphasized the unique position 
that that issue held in constitutional history.71
The school funding cases are helpful because they indicate that there 
may be laws that are insulated from Charter review because they are 
merely recognizing rights, as the Constitution demands. A challenge that 
demanded that citizens should not enjoy rights—like the right to enter 
or stay in Canada—that non-citizens do not enjoy would likewise fail. 
But in Adler, McLachlin J. makes a strong case that this does not entail 
that we should establish excessively broad areas of immunity where the 
Charter would not apply. Nevertheless, this seems to be the upshot of 
the decision in Charkaoui. In Adler, McLachlin J. proposes that claimants 
be permitted to make arguments in accord with the criteria set out in the 
equality jurisprudence. Their permitted challenge would nevertheless fail 
both where it is found that the law does not discriminate against them but 
also where the government shows that the discrimination is demonstrably 
justi? able in a free and democratic society. In Adler, McLachlin J. found 
that Ontario had done just that.
 V. Xenophobia and immigration law
My critique of the Charkaoui/Chiarelli analysis goes beyond the mere 
existence of friction created when one tries to ? t it within the more general 
doctrines of equality established elsewhere. By denying a section 15 
challenge to non-citizens where the law imposes an unfair disadvantage 
on them that is not imposed on citizens, the Charkaoui/Chiarelli doctrine 
68. Ibid at para 194.
69. Lavoie, supra note 37 at para 40.
70. 2003 BCCA 251.
71. Ibid. The Court stated, at para 109: “What is apparent from these passages, and from the judgment 
of Wilson J. as a whole, is that the reason s. 93 was immune from Charter review was because of a pre-
confederation compromise (“bargain”) designed to protect the Roman Catholic minority in Ontario 
and the Protestant minority in Quebec. This compromise, which carried with it certain built-in rights 
(and inequalities), was entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 29 of the Charter did not 
grant the right to immunity from Charter review under s. 15 or otherwise; it simply recognized and 
preserved the rights conferred by s. 93 in their historical context.”
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leaves few other options to the claimants. One option is to attempt to 
subsume the claim under another section of the ???????. However, there 
will be many cases of comparative disadvantage that will not meet the tight 
requirements of other sections. For example, the strict criteria that de? ne 
cruel and unusual treatment will exclude many forms of abusive behaviour 
that reveal that the individual is not considered as an equal. In addition, as 
noted above, non-citizens have had only limited success in getting courts 
to recognize that the immigration process engages the right to life liberty 
and security of the person and even where they have been successful in 
this regard the challenge of showing that the principles of fundamental 
justice have been infringed has been a dif? cult one. Moreover, the harm 
recognized by section 15—that it is an assault on one’s personality or 
identity to suffer the ignominy of treatment that indicates that one is less 
worthy as a human being as others who are under the law’s authority—is 
quite different from those recognized in the other sections. 
A second option is to argue one’s case as an equality case but to 
compare one’s treatment with that accorded to other groups of non-citizen. 
This option is premised on the idea that the law lives up to our equality 
principles within the realm of immigration by allowing a successful claim 
only when different rules are applied to different groups who must also 
negotiate their way through them. It is only where one can show that 
one is treated as a less valuable human being than other non-citizens that 
one’s equality rights will have been infringed. This idea should be met 
head on. By accepting it, one is implicitly denying that xenophobia is and 
throughout our history has been a social problem that surfaces regularly and 
that demands legal recognition. My primary critique of ??????????hinges 
on the idea?is that it fails to acknowledge the existence of xenophobia and 
its possible in? uence on our laws and misrepresents the nature of the harm 
suffered. The proposition that our laws have treated some non-citizens 
unequally because it has failed to accord them the same bene? ts accorded 
to other non-citizens is quite different from the proposition that the law 
has treated some non-citizens unequally because it has treated them as less 
worthy of respect than the citizenry.
The important point to note is that xenophobic measures need not 
uniformly oppress all non-citizens in the same way. Although some groups 
of non-citizen may be able to escape the application of a particular rule, 
this does not show that the rule is not an instantiation of a xenophobic body 
of law. As is emphasized in judicial statements about substantive equality, 
the discovery of formal differences in treatment amongst subgroups need 
not lead to the conclusion that the measure should not be identi? ed as an 
instantiation of a more general assault on the whole group. It is for this 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ??
reason that is both misleading and unsatisfactory to require non-citizens 
within the immigration regime to show that differential treatment is being 
imposed on different groups of non-citizen in speci? c situations. Their 
complaint is not that some other non-citizens have escaped the unfair 
disadvantagement. Excessively harsh rules and over-inclusive rules may 
be created and implemented ??????????? with little concern about the 
effect. Laws that impose hardship on only one subgroup of non-citizens 
may be passed by a populist government anxious to curry favour with 
xenophobic groups. By ill-treating non-citizens in such a fragmented and 
possibly arbitrary way the government may be able to show its disdain for 
non-citizens as a whole. Where a legal regime variably imposes burdens 
on non-citizens from different countries, it does not engage in multiple 
acts of discrimination against different subgroups. It engages in a more 
profound act of discrimination against the whole.
Once we have entered a realm in which the distinction between 
citizen and non-citizen has been made, and once we acknowledge that 
non-citizens are subject to intermittent, sporadic forms of ill treatment, our 
inquiry should cease to focus on ? nding comparator groups. The primary 
issue is ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????? We can use the criteria of substantive equality and 
the criteria from section 1 when making this inquiry. We should not impose 
any further comparative element. We distort the nature of the claim when 
we require litigants to show that they are worse off than other non-citizens.
The case of ???????72 may cast light on the idea that requiring 
non-citizens to show that they are treated differently from other non-
citizens ignores an important egalitarian concern. This case focused on 
discrimination ????? immigrants. It concerned a statutory measure which 
provided that applications for permanent residence as a member of the 
federal skilled worker class made before 27 February 2008 were to be 
terminated unless an of? cer had made a selection decision before 29 March 
2012. The applicants had applied for permanent resident visas before 27 
February 2008. They had been waiting many years for their applications to 
be processed but they were in fact cancelled, and noted that the processing 
was slower in some visa of? ces. They argued that the measure in question 
violated their s.15 rights. A large part of the decision focused on the issue 
whether ????????rights vest in non-citizens outside Canada, but this should 
not concern us here (although it should concern us). 
In the Federal Court, the applicants framed their challenge in terms that 
alleged that the measure discriminated against them on grounds of either 
72. ???????????????note 22.
??? ?????????????????????????
country of residence or national origin. Thus, the court was not asked to 
consider whether the measure in question is a manifestation of a general 
xenophobic antipathy that surfaces from time to time. While Rennie J. is 
happy to concede that national origin is an analogous ground for the claim, 
he ? nds that country of residence is not. He sums up his reasons thus:
When determining whether grounds of discrimination are analogous 
to those listed in section 15, courts should consider whether the 
characteristics at issue have historically served as “illegitimate and 
demeaning proxies for merit-based decision making” and whether the 
distinction being drawn affects a “discrete and insular minority or a 
group that has been historically discriminated against”….
It is doubtful that country of residence could be an analogous ground. 
Country of residence is not an immutable characteristic, nor is it vital 
to identity, given the applicants’ willingness to immigrate. Nor are the 
applicants a discrete and insular minority, and certainly not such a group 
within Canadian society. Country of residence, in contrast to race and 
religion, does not have the same historical antecedence of being a basis 
for discrimination, nor is there suf? cient evidence that would establish 
that residence is an illegitimate or demeaning proxy for merit-based 
decision making. Accordingly, I ? nd that country of residence is not an 
analogous ground of discrimination under section 15 of the ??????? and 
turn to the applicants’ argument based on national origin.73
The passages reveal the dif? culty that non-citizens face if we remove 
the opportunity to rely on their mere status of non-citizens. Any ground that 
they may select as analogous will likely be based on a distinction found 
in the law or created by the application of the law, in this case, country 
of residence. But such a distinction may lack the historical pedigree to 
convince the judge that it can give rise to a discrimination claim. When we 
have no historical experience with this type of distinction we do not even 
reach the stage of determining the substance of the claim. 
Ultimately Rennie J. found that the measure in question did not 
discriminate on the basis of national origin. This decision was upheld 
in the Federal Court of Appeal74 which dealt with the equality issue 
quite cursorily noting that that there was a rational explanation for slow 
processing in some visa of? ces that had nothing to do with discrimination. 
At neither level of court was the obvious question addressed: ??????
????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ?????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
73. ???? at paras 112-114.
74. ?????
???????????????????????????????????????????? ??
It is also useful to examine a second recent case, Canadian Doctors,75
where MacTavish J offers a perceptive account of recent section 15 
jurisprudence. The case concerned the constitutional validity of two Orders 
in Council that denied basic health care coverage to refugee claimants 
from designated countries. MacTavish J.’s careful analysis leads her to 
conclude that the orders discriminated on the grounds of national origin. 
However, she baulks at ? nding that the laws are discriminatory on more 
general grounds. She considers the argument that the laws discriminate 
on the basis of “immigration status” and concludes that she is bound by 
an earlier Federal Court of Appeal decision that immigration status is not 
analogous to the grounds identi? ed in section 15.76 In Toussaint v Canada77
Stratas J.A. had stated:
In my view, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Order in 
Council makes a distinction based on any enumerated or analogous 
ground that is relevant to her situation. …The primary distinction is said 
to be between foreign nationals possessing certain immigration status 
who are covered under the Order in Council, and other foreign nationals 
who possess another immigration status who are not covered….Further, I 
do not accept that “immigration status” quali? es as an analogous ground 
under section 15 of the Charter, for many of the reasons set out in Corbière 
v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), 1999 CanLII 687 
(SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 at paragraph 13, recently approved by the 
Supreme Court in Withler, supra at paragraph 33. “Immigration status” 
is not a “[characteristic] that we cannot change.” It is not “immutable 
or changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal identity.” Finally 
“immigration status”—in this case, presence in Canada illegally—is a 
characteristic that the government has a “legitimate interest in expecting 
[the person] to change.” Indeed, the government has a real, valid and 
justi? ed interest in expecting those present in Canada to have a legal 
right to be in Canada.78
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the merits of 
the conclusion that differentiations among foreign nationals cannot be 
discriminatory, the more general conclusion that “immigration status” is 
not an analogous ground because it is not immutable must be questioned. 
It should ? rst be noted that neither Corbière nor Withler addresses the 
question of immigration status. They merely re-iterate the need to 
show that the relevant characteristic is “immutable or changeable only 
at unacceptable cost to personal identity.” Stratas J.A.’s account of 
75. Canadian Doctors, supra note 7.
76. Ibid at para 870.
77. Toussaint v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 213.
78. Ibid at para 99.
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immigration status as mutable runs counter to common experience—it 
is notoriously dif? cult for the bulk of the world’s population to change 
its immigration status. It also runs counter to the more lax analysis of 
immutability found in Andrews, where status as a non-citizen is identi? ed 
as an analogous ground. It is unfortunate that MacTavish J.’s location in 
the judicial hierarchy precluded her from addressing this point or from 
extrapolating further from her analysis of the more general jurisprudence.
Yet another recent decision reveals some negative effects of requiring 
non-citizens to use more speci? c grounds of discrimination than their non-
citizen status. In YZ,79 the applicants alleged that denying an appeal to the 
Refugee Appeal Division of the IRB to refugee claimants from designated 
countries of origin (DCOs) violated section 15. Refugee claimants from 
other countries had access to the appeal process.
Referring to the ? rst part of the Withler two-part test, Boswell J. 
decided that a differentiation had been made on the ground of national 
origin. Turning to the second part of the test, he argued:
The distinction drawn between the procedural advantage now accorded 
to non-DCO refugee claimants and the disadvantage suffered by 
DCO refugee claimants under paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA 
is discriminatory on its face. It also serves to further marginalize, 
prejudice, and stereotype refugee claimants from DCO countries which 
are generally considered safe and “non-refugee producing.” Moreover, it 
perpetuates a stereotype that refugee claimants from DCO countries are 
somehow queue-jumpers or “bogus” claimants who only come here to 
take advantage of Canada’s refugee system and its generosity…
The introduction of paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA has deprived 
refugee claimants from DCO countries of substantive equality vis-à-vis 
those from non-DCO countries. Expressly imposing a disadvantage on the 
basis of national origin alone constitutes discrimination (Andrews at 174; 
Withler at paragraph 29), and this distinction perpetuates the historical 
disadvantage of undesirable refugee claimants and the stereotype that 
their fears of persecution or discrimination are less worthy of attention.80
[emphasis added]
In order to ? nd that there has been discrimination in this case, Boswell 
J, is forced to maintain that claimants from a DCO alone are subject to 
the stereotype of being queue jumpers. But in actuality, this stereotype 
was being launched more generally at all arrivals who were not waiting 
overseas to be resettled. When the measures designating countries of 
origin were introduced, other over-inclusive measures to discourage 
79. YZ, supra note 5.
80. Ibid at para 124.
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fraudulent refugees were also introduced. These measures had an impact 
on all refugee claimants, reducing the times to prepare for hearing and 
access to humanitarian and compassionate process and the Pre-Removal 
Risk Assessment. The justi? cation offered by Boswell J. while laudable 
in effect, offers a partial account of the contextual evidence and wrongly 
implies that refugee claimants from non-designated countries were not 
being slighted nor subject to the same abusive stereotypes.
This arti? cial analysis could have been avoided had Boswell J. 
conceded that the imposition of restrictive conditions on refugees from 
DCOs was but one assault amongst many that were targeting refugee 
claimants in general. We should not look for distinctions amongst the 
victims who have been violated by different attacks. We should instead 
recognize that it because they were part of the larger group of non-citizens 
that they were treated with disdain and disrespect.81
 Conclusion 
Cases such as Tabingo and YZ should not be read in isolation. Their direct 
precursors are Charkaoui and Chiarelli—cases that refuse to acknowledge 
that a vein of poison may have penetrated our immigration laws and may 
continue to do so in the future. This failure ensures that harsh and oppressive 
forms of treatment will likely be viewed as unique or isolated and directed 
towards discrete groups of non-citizens rather than as indicative of a more 
general and entrenched antagonism towards non-citizens as a whole. The 
requirement that non-citizens ? rst show that they are treated unfavourably 
in comparison with other non-citizens, and then show that the ground of 
differentiation is analogous to those listed in section 15, and then show 
that the difference reveals that they are being presented as less valuable 
persons than those others is a requirement that is not only dif? cult to meet 
but also one that fails to address the underlying problem—that we live in 
a culture in which currently there is large-scale distrust of newcomers, and 
anxiety about the changes that non-members will bring. As a consequence, 
demands are made that the government treat these anxieties seriously. 
In various ways and at various times, governments have revealed their 
willingness to comply to such demands and in doing so, have shown 
insuf? cient concern about the collateral impacts of our immigration laws 
on the individuals whose lives they shape.  Since Andrews, we have 
recognized this may surface as a problem outside the ? eld of immigration 
81. It should be noted that, on 17 May 2019, the Government removed all countries from the list of 
those designated as safe. See Government of Canada, “Canada Ends the Designated Country of Origin 
Practice,” (News Release, 17 May 2019), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/news/2019/05/canada-ends-the-designated-country-of-origin-practice.html>.
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